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If it is possible [for financial services firms] to make money out of gullible 
unsuspecting customers… [they think] that is perfectly acceptable.” 
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Telegraph 5
th
 March 2011 
 
“Judges are not simply umpires, impartially enforcing the fair rules of a voluntary and 
morally benign sporting event. Judges have political power in a legal system that may 
only be partially just or legitimate, or that may occasionally demand what it ought not 
demand. This significantly complicates the moral position of the judge, and we need 
an approach to adjudication that is cognizant of this complexity” (Reeves 2010, p. 
186) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Summary 
Judges have more discretion in cases than they themselves, legal scholars and practitioners 
acknowledge. The shape and outcome of the law ultimately depends on the judicial 
interpretation of its extent, scope and application. Judicial interpretation, it is argued, is 
influenced by judicial discretion. The core argument of this article is that judicial discretion 
outweighs other considerations in the Supreme Court‟s decision in Office of Fair Trading v 
                                                     
1
 A version of this paper was delivered at the Society of Legal Scholars‟ Conference in 2010. 
Abbey National Plc and Others [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 A.C. 696 (hereafter “the 
judgment”). The chief purpose of this paper is to identify the pivotal role of judicial 
discretion in the above case with a view to determining the parameters that informed the 
Supreme Court‟s decision. This article attempts to illustrate that the decision in the judgment 
rests mainly on the exercise of discretion on certain key issues.  
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
This article argues that the challenge before the Supreme Court and the lower courts in the 
case under study was a conflict between doing substantial justice as opposed to doing 
technical justice.  The case is, in this sense, dependent on the exercise of judicial discretion as 
to the interpretation of the law, a duty which is assigned to the courts, not the legislature. As 
the paper will elaborate, the judgment was largely a triumph of technicality over substantial 
justice. The practical consequence of which was to endorse the banks right to “impose hefty 
charges on their customers” (Barrow, 2010). Leveraging on jurisprudential discourse and 
procedural analysis of judicial discretion, this paper critically assesses the challenges faced 
by the Supreme Court within the particular context of this case, as well as the alternative 
routes that were available to the Court.  
 
Theoretical explanation of Judicial Discretion 
Judicial discretion is an elusive concept. Its existence is generally acknowledged but its ambit 
is not agreed upon by scholars and practitioners alike (Barak, 1989, p 3, Robertson, 1998, p. 
6). Because the existing legal system is not perfect, it is inevitable that judicial discretion 
remains part of the system (Klatt, 2007, p. 506). As Waddams notes: 
 
”All legal rules, as has always been recognised, contain elements of uncertainty, 
because the circumstances in which the rules come to be applied cannot be precisely 
foreseen, nor can any rule, however detailed, describe in advance every possible 
future case.” (Wadams, 2001, p. 59) 
 
On the one side of the debate is the American realist who argues that in almost all cases a 
judicial officer is capable of deciding a case before it in “directly contradictory way” in 
favour of either a claimant or a defendant and thereafter find adequate grounds for justifying 
either outcome (Yablon, 1989, p. 236). This approach thus rejects authoritative legal rules as 
sufficient basis for judicial decisions. This poses the question of whether judicial decisions 
are random or arbitrary. Any suggestion that judicial decisions are arbitrary or random, Klatt 
observed, is implausible (Klatt, 2007, p. 507). The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) are on this 
side of the debate. They argue that law is politics and judicial decisions are not neutral or 
value free. Law, according to them, is indeterminate. The scholars went further by suggesting 
that the law usually serves the interest of the powerful and the rich and less in favour of 
others outside those classes. (Hutchinson, 1989 p. 4, Tushnet, 2005).  The CLS scholars 
contend that “judges decide cases without being bound by precedents, or any other pre-
existing legal rule”(Segall, 1994, p. 992). 
 
On the other side of the argument is the approach promoted and led by H.L.A. Hart (Hart, 
2007). Hart acknowledges the existence of certain amounts of discretion in the judicial 
decision making process but argues that they apply in very limited circumstances. To Harts 
and theorists that ascribe to this view, judges are constrained in significant ways by legal 
rules (Yablon, 1989, p. 238). The judges‟ decisions are thus largely determined by the legal 
rules even if on occasion they are loosely applied. To Hart, discretion is what occurs when 
the guidance of authoritative legal rules run out and then the judge had to assume the role of a 
law maker (Yablon, 1989, p. 239). Even though Dworkin, (a student of Hart‟s) accepted the 
core argument of Hart, he contended that the judge is never without an authoritative legal rule 
to decide a case. According to him, where the judge needs to employ his discretion, he is 
following a rule even though it may be vague and open textured (Yablon, 1989, p. 241). The 
judge may justify his or her choice by nebulous concepts as fairness, the interest of justice, 
expediency etc. The role of the judge therefore is to “consider various potentially applicable 
norms in reaching her decision” (Yablon, 1989, p. 242). Klatt will seem to be of the same 
opinion when he says that  
 
“[d]iscretion ...is a relative concept. It refers to a given standard of authority against 
which the area of freedom can be measured. Interpreting discretion as a relative 
concept is equivalent to accepting that discretion is limited, whatever those limits may 
be”. (Klatt, 2007, p. 507) 
 
Apart from the jurisprudential or theoretical discourse on judicial discretion, scholars taking a 
procedural angle have also contributed to the discourse. Davis defines judicial discretion in 
the following way: “A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his 
power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction” (Davis, 
1969, p. 4). 
 
Judicial discretion allows flexibility in the application of law (Klatt, 2007, p. 508) and 
ensures that judges can potentially fill in the gap where there is a gap in the law. The problem 
however is that the concept also creates uncertainty in the outcome of judicial process and 
make the process vulnerable to the individual (moral) conviction of the judges (Klatt, 2007, 
p. 507). 
 
Background to OFT v Abbey National Plc 
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) had jurisdiction, under the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2083), to consider the fairness of “a contractual term 
which has not been individually negotiated”. Regulation 5 provides as follows: 
 
 “Unfair Terms 
5.  - (1) A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer. 
 
(2) A term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where 
it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to 
influence the substance of the term. 
 
(3) Notwithstanding that a specific term or certain aspects of it in a contract has been 
individually negotiated, these Regulations shall apply to the rest of a contract if an 
overall assessment of it indicates that it is a pre-formulated standard contract. 
 
(4) It shall be for any seller or supplier who claims that a term was individually 
negotiated to show that it was. 
 
(5) Schedule 2 to these Regulations contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of 
the terms which may be regarded as unfair.” 
 
The consequence of the provision according to Reg 8(1) is that such a term is “not binding on 
the consumer” (under Reg 8(2). However this may not affect the validity of the contract if 
severance is possible. According to Reg 10 of the 1999 Regulations, the OFT is obligated to 
investigate a complaint that a contractual provision is unfair under regulation 5 where that 
provision is in “general use”. However, a limitation is placed on this power under regulation 
6. Reg 6(2) of the 1999 Regulations provides that: 
 
“In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of fairness of a term 
shall not relate- 
(a) to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract, or 
(b) to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or 
services supplied in exchange.” 
 
Reg. 6(2) is generally perceived as a compromise to satisfy freedom of contract proponents 
(Morgan, 2010, p 209, Collins, 1994, p. 238). Nevertheless, the Regulation as a whole had 
led to the hitherto widely held assumption that that its provisions introduced significant 
protection for consumers (McDonald, 2002, p 763), Bright, 2000, p. 331).   
 
Factual Background to OFT v Abbey National Plc 
The OFT in the past few years have been actively engaged in the protection of consumers 
who have been at the wrong end of the aggressive target driven corporate drive for profit. It 
has succeeded in a number of cases to get companies to change their practices. It has also 
taken the judicial route to facilitate the achievement of its objectives. It was with the aim of 
achieving its objectives that it found it expedient to intervene in the case under study.  
 
Bank customers were routinely subjected to high charges for unauthorised or authorised 
overdrafts (including charges made for bounced cheques or other payments made in the 
absence of fund). This has not always been the norm in banking practice in the past. 
Previously, a customer was not allowed to overdraw his or her account without authority or 
consent of the bank.  Furthermore, the Courts have held that if a customer overdraws his or 
her account without authority and the bank honours it, he is taken to have requested an 
overdraft and the bank by granting the request accepted the request (Foley v Hill (1848) 2 
HCL 28). In accepting the overdraft the bank applied its standard terms to the transaction. 
The banks could have maintained this practice but they did not do so.  In 2005, bank 
customers started bringing claims against their banks. The claims were hinged upon two main 
arguments either that the charges were illegal penalties or that the terms giving rise to them 
were unfair under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999. Some of these 
cases were settled out of Court but with an increasing number of cases being filed it became 
apparent to the banks that they might have to risk a judicial pronouncement. An agreement 
was reached between the OFT and the banks to the effect that the OFT could make an 
application to the Commercial Court to seek a declaration whether the charges could be 
challenged as illegal penalties and whether the OFT could investigate the fairness of the 
charges under the regulation. The High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court all 
agreed, and rightly so, that the charges do not amount to illegal penalties. The High Court and 
the Court of Appeal however held that the OFT could investigate the fairness of the charges 
under the Regulations. However, the Supreme Court disagreed declaring:  
 
(3) “that, the bank charges levied on personal current account customers in respect of 
unauthorised overdrafts (including unpaid item charges and other related charges) 
constitutes part of the price or remuneration for the banking services provided and, in 
so far as the terms giving rise to the charges are in plain intelligible language, no 
assessment under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 of the 
fairness of those terms may relate to their adequacy as against the services supplied 
 
(4) The bank charges referred to in the declaration at paragraph (3) above and the 
terms giving rise to them are the bank charges...” 
 
This judgment dealt a blow to the attempt by the OFT to investigate the fairness of 
unarranged overdraft charges and compelled the OFT to abandon the investigation.  
 
Clarifying the Case That Was Presented: The Interpretation of “Term 
and Charges” 
It is common ground that the bank terms were not individually negotiated therefore falling 
under Reg. 5 and provisions of the Schedule to the Regulation. It is also apparent that the 
OFT has the statutory power to consider or assess the unfairness of “any contract term drawn 
up for general use” (Reg 10). The three courts also agreed that the terms are substantially 
plain and intelligible and as such does not contravene Reg 6(2).  
 
The crucial issue for the court to decide was whether the terms upon which the charges are 
based are barred from being assessed by Reg 6(2) (a) and (b). For Reg 6(2) to apply the term 
the OFT sought to assess must either 
 
i. Relate to “the definition of the main subject matter of the contract” or 
ii. Relate “to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or 
services supplied in exchange”. 
 
The Supreme Court was correctly of the opinion that Reg 6(2)(a) is not relevant to the 
determination of this case. The case was decided based on the application of Reg 6(2)(b).  
 
Before going further, it will be pertinent to examine the nuances of the case presented by the 
OFT. In doing this, it is important to draw a distinction between price terms and other terms 
of a contract. 
 
In contract law, the terms of a contract and the price/remuneration payable under the contract 
are not necessarily the same thing. Generally, the terms are parties‟ conditions for entering 
into a contract i.e. the obligations and duty assumed by each party. The terms cover several 
issues and may generally include the description of the good or services supplied, manner of 
delivery, price and payment structure, termination and limitation of liability etc. 
 
A careful reading of Reg 6(2)(b) shows that the provision  does not exclude all the terms of 
contract but terms that are related to the adequacy of the price or remuneration. Lord Walker 
acknowledged this view when he noted that the House of Lord‟s decision  
 
“in First National Bank shows that not every term that is in some way linked to 
monetary consideration falls within Regulation 6(2)(b). Paras (d), (e), (f) and (l) of the 
“greylist” in Schedule 2 to the 1999 Regulations are illustration of that”. 
 
However, he summarily concluded that in this case “the Relevant Terms and Relevant 
Charges do fall squarely within Regulation 6 (2)(b)” (para 42). 
 
What the Supreme Court did as shown in its judgment was to equate all the terms in dispute 
with the charges and concluded that they were excluded from assessment by 6(2)(b). The 
Supreme Court‟s approach is best shown by Lord Phillip‟s recast of the issue raised by the 
appeal (para 57): 
 
“The agreed Statement of Facts and Issue describes the issue raised by this appeal as 
follows: 
“Whether an assessment of the fairness of the Relevant Terms (pursuant to which the 
Relevant Charges are levied) would relate to the adequacy of the price and 
remuneration, as against the services supplied in exchange, within the meaning of 
regulation 6(2)(b) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.” 
 
This does not accurately describe the issue raised by this appeal, which is very much 
more narrow. That issue is whether the Relevant Charges constitute “the price or 
remuneration, as against the services supplied in exchange” within the meaning of the 
Regulation.” 
 
By strictly narrowing the dispute to this “small point of construction” (Morgan, 2010, p. 208) 
the Supreme Court was able to proceed on the assumption that all the “Relevant Terms” in 
dispute are also the “Relevant Charges”. Whittaker recently suggested that the Supreme 
Court was constrained by the agreement of the parties. However, the question posed by the 
Supreme Court was very different from the one put forward by the parties. The decision of 
the Supreme Court to recast the question affected the scope of the answer that was required 
(Whittaker, 2011, p. 106). Chen-Wishart correctly noted the consequence of the court recast 
of the question which was that “the Supreme Court held that regulation 6(2)(b) covers any 
price or remuneration terms  and that unarranged overdraft bank charges, being price terms 
are so exempt from the unfairness assessment” (Chen-Wishart, 2010, p. 157). 
 
However, it is argued that the issues may be broader than that. There are two principal issues. 
One relates to the interpretation of the terms of the contract. The second is the applicability or 
otherwise of the Regulation to the relevant term. 
  
The law relating to interpretation of contract has been summarised in five principles by Lord 
Hoffman in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1997] 
UKHL 28, [1998] 1 W.L.R 896 and further summarised by Lord Bingham in BCCI v Ali 
[2001] UKHL 8, [2002] 1 A.C. 251 as follows: 
 “To ascertain the intention of the parties the court reads the terms of the contract as a 
whole, giving the words used their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of the 
agreement, the parties‟ relationship and all the relevant facts surrounding the 
transaction so far as known to the parties. To ascertain the parties‟ intentions the court 
does not of course inquire into the parties‟ subjective states of mind but makes an 
objective judgment based on the materials already identified.” 
 
This approach is largely accepted as the position of the law in England (Lewison, 2007, p. 3). 
This approach favours the interpretation that would be given to the terms by reasonable 
person (natural and ordinary meaning) and importantly exclude their subjective intent. This is 
an objective exercise (Lewison, 2007, p. 24). Crucially, where a contract can have more than 
one meaning, the court has the discretion to select one meaning (Lewison, 2007, p29). It has 
been suggested persuasively that Courts sometimes manipulate the interpretation of contract 
in order to achieve a fair result based on the facts of a particular case (Lewison, 2007, p. 48) 
which raises the question whether what is considered fair by the judge at a particular point in 
time aligns with what the average person in the society considers to be fair. 
 
The main challenge before the Court is the interpretation of the terms of the contract and the 
determination of what categories of terms they belong to in order to determine the 
applicability of Reg 6 (2)(b) or otherwise.  Lord Mance correctly identified this task when he 
opined that  
 
“the identification of the price or remuneration for the purposes of Article 4(2) and 
regulation 6 (2) is a matter of objective interpretation for the court. The court should 
no doubt read and interpret the contract in the usual manner, that is having regard to 
the view which the hypothetical reasonable person would take of its nature and 
terms”. (Para 113) 
 As Posner correctly noted “contract interpretation is the undertaking by a judge or jury... to 
figure out what the terms of a contract are, or should be understood to be”(Posner, 2004, p. 
1582). This is what the parties would have understood the terms to mean. Where the parties‟ 
intention is not explicit or contradictory then the court steps in to fill in the gap. According to 
Posner, there are several alternatives open to the Court. The Court may 
 
“1. Try to determine what the parties really meant… 
2. Try to determine what resolution the parties would have agreed to had the 
issue occurred to them when they were negotiating the contract. 
3. Pick the economically efficient solution… 
4.  Treat the case as a toss-up, and apply some rule for breaking ties…  
5.  Combine 1 and 4 by pretending that a written contract always embodies the 
complete agreement of the parties and that no other evidence of the contract‟s 
meaning, besides the text itself, is to be considered..”. (Posner, 2004, p. 1582) 
 
To understand how the Supreme Court proceeds, it is pertinent to examine as an example one 
of the clauses considered by the Courts. In this connection we shall examine Clause 3 of the 
Abbey National‟s term considered by the lower court on instant over draft which provides as 
follows: 
 
“3.3 Instant Overdrafts  
3.3.1 Without contracting us at all, you may also request an overdraft 
by trying to make a payment from your current account, where that 
payment would:  
(i) cause your current account to go overdrawn without an 
Advance Overdraft in place; or  
(ii) cause your current account to go over any Advance 
Overdraft limit we have previously agreed with you.  
In either case this is referred to as an Instant Overdraft request.  
3.3.2 You will be treated as making an Instant Overdraft request to us automatically if 
you do not have enough money in your current account, or enough unused Advance 
Overdraft with us and you do any of the following:  
(i) you try to purchase goods or services using your debit card or by cheque;  
(ii) you try to withdraw money from your current account;  
(iii) you try to make a payment from your current account against a cheque 
which is later returned unpaid or against any other deposit in your current 
account which has not been processed; or  
(iv) an automated payment you have set up, such as a Direct Debit or a 
standing order, is requested to be paid.  
3.3.3 An Instant Overdraft Request Fee will be payable by you each time that you use 
the Instant Overdraft service. The Instant Overdraft Request Fee is payable regardless 
of whether we agree to give you the Instant Overdraft requested.  
Important: Payment of the Instant Overdraft Request Fee may result in you becoming 
overdrawn (or, if you already have an overdraft, further overdrawn) even if we do not 
agree to give you the Instant Overdraft.  
3.3.4 We may give you an Instant Overdraft or we may refuse to do so. If we agree, 
we will give you an Instant Overdraft to cover the amount of the withdrawal or the 
payment involved. An Instant Overdraft Monthly Fee will by (sic) payable by you 
monthly for every calendar month in which you have used our Instant Overdraft 
service (including where you continue to use an existing Instant Overdraft facility). 
Interest will also be payable by you at the Instant Overdraft Interest Rate on any 
money you borrow by way of an Instant Overdraft. If we refuse your Instant 
Overdraft request but your account is in credit or, if you have an Advance Overdraft 
and your account still has some unused Advance Overdraft on it, then you will not 
have to pay the Instant Overdraft Monthly Fee.” 
 
The clause throws up the following possibilities: The overdraft facility may be treated as a 
secondary contract and therefore independent of the main contract or treated as part of the 
main contract. It is thus possible for the court to treat the instant overdraft as a different 
product founded on separate contractual terms or as the court did as part of the original 
contractual arrangement. It is important to note that an overdraft is usually treated as a loan 
facility. Bank loan facilities are based on separate terms different from the terms for a current 
account (Cranston, 2002, p. 299, Morris, 1967, p. 574). If this is accepted, then a treatment as 
a separate contract will be more compelling (more on this later).  A further inquiry is whether 
or not all these terms related to „charges‟.  
 
A plain reading of these clauses should lead to the following conclusions: 
 
1. Clause 3.3.1 is an invitation to treat in relation to a product-Instant Overdraft Request. 
Arguably, this product is not part of the original contract for a current account. 
2. Clause 3.3.2 states when the action of the customer will be taken as an automatic 
application for the product. (This can be regarded as an offer coming from the 
customer.) 
3. Clause 3.3.3 states that a fee will be payable. This is a term of the contract that may 
arguably be linked with price and remuneration. However the clause itself does not 
specify the fees payable.  
4. Clause 3.3.4 specifies the Bank‟s possible response to an instant overdraft application. 
This may be regarded as the acceptance of an offer leading to liability to pay further 
fees.  
 
The fees referred to in clauses 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 is set out in another document with the title 
“key features and price list”. 
 
From the plain interpretation of the clause 3, it is suggested that not all the terms in the clause 
are related to price and charges. This is particularly true of Clauses 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. It is 
submitted that clause 3 should not in its entirety be caught by Reg 6 (b) in so far as it relates 
to an unsolicited and a unilateral invitation to treat of an additional product. They are the 
terms of a contract whose consequence like any other contract is a charge if the contract is 
duly executed by the parties. While the charge itself may be caught by 6(2)(b), the terms of 
the contract leading up to the charge should be opened to scrutiny by the OFT. It is thus 
opined that the position of the OFT that it could assess the fairness of the terms applicable to 
unarranged overdrafts etc under the test set out in regulation appears to be well founded. It 
thus appears that the court simply imposes what it thinks the term meant without having 
much regard for the contract itself (Calnan, 2007, p. 18). 
 
Consumer Protection v Consumer Choice 
This case takes the debate between the proponents of consumer choice and those for 
consumer protection which dominated discussion before the making of the EC Directive and 
after it to the Supreme Court but not for the first time. In Director-General of Fair Trading v. 
First National Bank Plc [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481 the House of Lords considered 
the version of the exemption in 3(2) UTCCR 1994 which is similar to 6(2) of UTCCR 1999. 
Lord Bingham stated that the purpose of the directive is to protect customers and that purpose 
will be defeated if the exception were broadly interpreted.  
 
While Lord Walker correctly noted that the directive reflected a compromise between the 
view points, it assumed that in the face of a conflict between the two, the freedom of contract 
view should triumph. However, since there is nothing in the directive or regulations that lend 
credence to this assumption, it is a path chosen at the discretion of the court. It is interesting 
to note that the Supreme Court criticized the Court of Appeal for going too far in interpreting 
the language of the law. As Chen-Wishart correctly noted the Supreme Court went to the 
other extreme by opting for the consumer choice view (Chen-Wishart, 2010, p. 161). It is 
noted that the Supreme Court relied on influential academic articles (The articles are 
Brandner and Ulmer, 1991 p 647 and Colins, 1994 p 229). But as Chen-Wishart correctly 
noted the same articles are opened to the alternative interpretation that will support a 
restrictive interpretation of the regulation. 
 
There were two choices opened to the Supreme Court on this point. These are either to 
interpret the regulation‟s purpose as consumer protection in which case it will likely interpret 
the regulation to achieve that purpose or to interpret its purpose as transparency of consumer 
choice. The Supreme Court decided to take the later approach. As stated earlier, justification 
for this line of reasoning in the Supreme Court‟s opinion is that the Regulation prioritizes the 
freedom of contract as opposed to their reasonableness .Thus, the regulation is not so much 
about consumer protection but consumer choice.  
 
However, if this is the case, the legislation is not substantially different from the traditional 
contract law which emphasizes autonomy to contract. This approach runs contrary to the EC 
Directive whose purpose was consumer protection. According to Article 8 of the Directive 
“Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty  
in the area covered by this Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the 
consumer”.(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court is well able to follow an approach that will 
achieve the objective of consumer protection but instead decided to infer a different purpose 
for the regulation implementing the directive in the UK.  
 
“Unfair Surprise” 
An affirmation that the Regulation is in accordance with s.8 of the Directive is about 
consumer protection would have opened up further possibilities. For example Davies has 
suggested that it was opened to the Supreme Court to recognise an implied principle which 
emanated from the judgments of the lower courts. This principle he called the principle of 
“unfair surprise”.  According to him, 
 
“A pertinent principle, not expressly articulated by any of the judges but latent in the 
judgments of the lower courts, is that of “unfair surprise”. If a reasonable consumer 
would be surprised by any term, then the assessment of the fairness of that term 
should not be excluded by regulation 6. A reasonable consumer may well be 
flabbergasted to be charged £40 for being overdrawn by £1 for only a day; the vast 
majority of customers do not consider insufficient fund charges to be an essential 
element of the contract they enter into with the bank. Sheltering such terms from a test 
of fairness does little to further the goal of consumer protection”. (Davies, 2010, p. 
21) 
 
While it may be argued that this idea is radical, it is opined that the court could have taken 
such a route if it had interpreted the purpose of the regulation to be consumer protection and 
not consumer choice.  
 
Price and Remuneration and the Composite Argument 
 
The relevant legislation does not define “price & remuneration”.  It was left to the court to 
determine the meaning of the phrase and what constitute price and remuneration. This is not a 
matter of Statute because what will constitute the price will differ depending on the context 
of a particular contract. Understanding that the exorbitant charges cannot be reasonably 
claimed to be for the service rendered or not rendered as the case may be, the Court had to 
decide what the charges in dispute are for. Accordingly, Lord Philips said: “... that a careful 
analysis of the transactions giving rise to the obligation to pay the Relevant Charges leads to 
the conclusion that they are not the prices paid in exchange for the transactions in 
question”(para 75 and 107).  
 
However, the court came to a conclusion that certainly cannot be obvious to an average 
customer and even to the more than average customer. In their judgment, their Lordships 
were of the opinion that the charges are remuneration and price that is paid for a package of 
banking services; an event that is only triggered when a customer engages in unauthorised 
overdraft for whatever reason: inadvertent or deliberate. The conclusion of the Court was 
based on what can be conveniently called the “composite” argument.  Lord Walker ably 
summarise the composite argument as follows: “Charges for unauthorised overdrafts are 
monetary consideration for the package of banking services supplied to personal account 
customers” (para 47). The Supreme Court was of the view that services offered by the banks 
to their current account customers are a composite package comprising: authorised or 
unauthorised overdrafts, usage of cheques, money transmission services, cash transactions 
and other administrative services. Payments for these services are also made in a composite 
manner including: interest forgone by customers in credit, overdraft charges for unauthorised 
or authorised overdrafts  (including charges made for a bounced cheque or other payments 
made in the absence of fund) for those not in credit.   
 
It must be noted that the Court of Appeal also accepted this line of reasoning. However, it 
was opened to the Supreme Court to accept this line of reasoning or Andrew J‟s approach at 
the High Court. Andrew J concluded that the Relevant Charges were not charges for any 
service supplied. They were not payments for the individual service that triggered them. For 
example, turning down a request to honour a cheque on an overdrawn account cannot 
reasonably be described as a service. However, the court chose to construe the price and 
remuneration in such a way that appears to mean that bank customers were on a single 
composite contract by which they pay for services render to others. The price paid is thus not 
viewed in term of the service rendered to the individual but the “composite”. This line of 
reasoning will seem to suggest that customers pay for a wider scope of services beyond the 
services rendered to them. This will appear logically to mean that they unwittingly offer 
consideration for services rendered to others.  
 
Three problems arise from this line of reasoning: The Court‟s approach is an expost 
reconstruction of the contract between the parties.  How would a consumer have understood 
this pricing structure and contractual mesh? The trial judge also noted this point (para 67). A 
further question is whether this arrangement is transparent enough to meet the objective of 
the regulation. The Supreme Court also attempted to justify the charges by pointing to the 
amount of revenue generated by the bank from the charging structure (For a contrary opinion 
see Morgan, 2010, p. 212).  According to Lord Phillips  
 
“Whatever may have been the position in the past, the Banks now rely on the 
Relevant Charges as an important part of the revenue that they generate from the 
current account services. If they did not receive the Relevant Charges they would not 
be able to profitably to provide current account services to their customers in credit 
without making a charge to augment the value of the use of their funds.” 
 
Lord Walker also stated that: 
 
“Charges for unauthorised overdrafts are money consideration for the package of 
banking services supplied to personal current account customers.  They are an 
important part of the banks‟ charging structure, amounting to over 30 per cent of their 
revenue stream from all personal current account customers.  The facts that the 
charges are contingent, and that the majority of customers do not incur them, are 
irrelevant.” (para 47) 
 
 However it does not appear reasonable to argue that the mere fact that bank generates a lot of 
money from the charges makes it right as suggested by the Supreme Court. According to 
Whittaker,  
 
“…these arguments come very close to saying that the fact that the banks make a 
good deal of money out of the charges generated by the relevant terms means that 
they provide for part of the price or remuneration for the package of services. 
Moreover, rather than taking an objective approach to the determination of the price 
for the purposes of regulation 6(2)(b), they adopt the viewpoint of the supplier of the 
goods or services”. (Whittaker, 2011, p115) 
 
Nothing compels the banks to generate profit this way. As the court noted, banks in other 
European countries such as France generate their income in a different way.  
 
An alternative approach to the complex composite service and composite consideration 
construction is to simply interpret the customers‟ contract as one between an individual and 
the bank as argued earlier. Thus whatever consideration that is offered should be for the 
service rendered to the individual. This of course would have posed the dilemma of justifying 
the exorbitant charges under scrutiny. Here again discretion comes to play. The composite 
argument was one adopted at the discretion of the court to depart from the simple contract 
interpretation and to justify the charges.  
 
The Discretion to Challenge Further: The European Court of Justice 
Option 
Another point of the exercise of judicial discretion is in relation to the refusal possible appeal 
to the ECJ.  This is despite the fact that as Lord Walker noted that “The Court of Justice has 
not yet had occasion to rule on the scope of Article 4 (2)” (para 9). The Supreme Court 
summarily closed the door on the ground that the issue in this case is acte clair. (Davies 
notes, “[t]his is a dubious conclusion; after all four, experienced judges disagreed with the 
Supreme Court‟s interpretation” (2010, p. 23).   Even if that is not the case, the court was of 
the view that a correct interpretation of Article 4(2) is not essential to the case and the delay 
that will follow a reference should therefore be avoided. This is essentially a public interest 
argument.  
 
The ECJ has the general disposition to interpret community law in a way that achieve 
community objective. There is the nagging question whether the interpretation given to the 
provision accord with community objective which should have been a matter for the ECJ. 
According to Woodroffe and Lowe, 
 
“The English Courts must construe domestic law (the Regulations) in such a way as to 
give effect to the purpose of the Directive…Since one of the objects of the Directive 
is to approximate the laws of Member States the Courts may well give particular 
words… a European meaning; anyone putting forward an argument in this area should 
not do so in purely Anglo-Saxon terms”. (Woodroffe and Low, 2010, p. 163) 
 
There is also the genuine possibility that by that decision, the UK consumer protection 
regime as interpreted may be not be in line with community law. As Lord Walker correctly 
pointed out, the fact that the two lower courts disagreed is a clear indication that the point 
may not be that acte clair and an approach to the ECJ may be more palatable to the general 
public that are bound to be affected by the decision. However, he refused reference on this 
ground and because he was of the opinion that the lower courts were clearly wrong.  In 
respect of the public interest argument (para 50), it may be argued that the decision plays 
more in favour of corporate interest rather than public interest. 
 
Lord Walker said that the correct construction of Article 4(2) of the Directive was not 
essential for the appeal (para 50).  However, the judgement itself was based on the 
interpretation of what constitute “price and remuneration” in the equivalent of article 4(2) 
under domestic law.  It was the Court‟s understanding of the phrase that informs its adoption 
of the composite argument. It is thus submitted that a reference to the ECJ would have 
clarified the ambit of Reg 4 (2) which in turn affects the application of the Regulation to the 
facts by the court. The refusal to refer the Directive for interpretation in this case and in the 
earlier First National Bank‟s case has been criticized (Dean 2002 p. 773; Morgan, 2010, p. 
209; Whittaker, 2011, p. 106).  
 
Conclusion 
Judicial decisions shaped the foundation of modern banking law and practice. It has played 
important roles in shaping the relationship between the bank and the customer. It has been 
suggested in this article that the court‟s decision in this case has less to do with statute 
interpretation and application and more to do with the use of discretion to choose between 
several competing options. The options, it is argued, are equally valid, plausible and can be 
supported in law. The implication is not only that the choice determines whether one party 
succeed or fail, it also has significant consequences for the relationship between bank and 
society.  
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